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FOREWORD: POLITICS, PRAGMATISM
AND THE COURTS
ANTHONY E. VARONA*
Few would question that the year 2000 was a big one for the history books.
Federal and state courts decided an array of groundbreaking cases in the areas of
gender, sexuality and sexual orientation law. These cases are expertly chronicled
in this Second Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law, which is sure to
become a uniquely valued reference book for practitioners, judges, legislators
and scholars.
The most enlightening recent case for civil rights lawyers, however, did not
involve gender or sexuality law directly, but provided us nevertheless with an
important reminder about the true nature of the American judiciary. The Supreme
Court's Bush v. Gore1 decision was a blockbuster not only insofar as it dictated
which candidate ascended to the presidency, but also because it demonstrated
(once again) that the Supreme Court is a political and often partisan institution.
We place our judges and courts atop pedestals far above the political fray. As
schoolchildren, Americans are taught that the genius of our federal system lies in
the checks and balances created by the separation of our three branches of
government, with the judicial branch governing by reason alone. As lawyers,
most of us persist in idealizing our judges and courts as neutral entities whose
primary motivation is the objective application of legal reasoning, with little
regard for political sentiment or partisan allegiances. Judges not only embrace,
but also promote, this politically agnostic image. Speaking to a class of high
school students late last year, Justice Clarence Thomas warned against applying
the rules of the political world to the Supreme Court, claiming that they are
"entirely different worlds" and that "[tihe last political act we engage in is
confirmation."2
Legal and political organizations within the American civil rights community
* General Counsel & Legal Director, Human Rights Campaign, and Adjunct Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center. The author expresses his gratitude to Mason Emnett, Daryl
Herrschaft, William Isasi, Kevin Layton, Kim Mills, and Liz Seaton for their helpful insights and
suggestions, and to Sam Slater and the staff of the Second Annual Review for their skillful editing and for
publishing such an excellent resource.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. See Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, The Truth Behind the Pillars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 2000, at
46. Judicial pretense notwithstanding, early observers. of the American judicial system took note of the
political power of judges. French writer Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, wrote "[An American
judge's] position is... invested with immense political power .... Whenever a law which the judge
holds to be unconstitutional is argued in a tribunal of the United States, he may refuse to admit it as a rule;
this power is the only one which is peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gives him immense
political influence." Alexis de Tocqueville, Judicial Power in the United States, DEMoCRAcY IN AMERiCA
(1835), reprinted in COURTS, JUDGES AND PoLmcs: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 44
(Walter F. Murphy & C. Herman Pritchett eds., McGraw-Hill, 1986).
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have clung to this idealized view of the courts, and have organized themselves to
deal with courts and politics as two separate entities. We have one set of
advocates and organizations focused almost exclusively on bringing test case
litigation, and another set dedicated to advancing equitable legislation in
Congress and in the state legislatures. These advocates and organizations work in
their respective areas independently, rarely regarding courts as political entities.
Bush v. Gore was our reality check. It unmasked, once and for all, the political
and partisan motivations of the Supreme Court and by implication, other federal
courts. The five-member conservative majority, all appointed by Republicans,
shut down the hand recounting of Florida ballots, ignoring that the election was
plagued by voting irregularities and that the Florida Supreme Court had earlier
ordered the hand recounts to continue.3 In so doing, members of the Bush v. Gore
majority acted openly as partisans. Justice Scalia, for example, applied blatantly
partisan and circular logic in concurring with the majority's decision to stop the
recounts. He claimed that the Court had no choice but to stop the recount in order
to preserve the legitimacy of a Bush presidency, stating "the counting of votes
that are of questionable legality does in my view threaten irreparable harm to
petitioner [Bush], and to the country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims to
be the legitimacy of his election.",
4
Without articulating any coherent legal justification, the Bush Court overruled
the decision of the Florida Supreme Court interpreting the state's law governing
the administration of elections, an area historically left to the purview of the
states.5 This invasion of state authority by the Court was a striking about-face
from the Court's decade-long insistence on state sovereignty and in some
instances, supremacy, over Federal authority. 6 This was the same conservative
3. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
4. See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512, 512 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). But see id. at 512 -13 (Stevens,
J. dissenting) ("preventing the recount from being completed will inevitably cast a cloud on the
legitimacy of the election"). Another clearly partisan outburst from a Supreme Court Justice allegedly
took place at an election night party on November 7, at which, following the first news report that Gore
had won Florida, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor exclaimed "this is terrible," leaving it to her husband to
explain that O'Connor wanted to retire and that if Gore won, she would have to wait an additional four
years. See Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, The Truth Behind the Pillars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 2000, at
46.
5. See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512, 555-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 582 U.S. 62 (2000) (Congress did not act appropriately in
abrogating state sovereign immunity when it authorized suits under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act against states in federal courts); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Congress had no
power to force state courts to entertain federally created claims for damages against state defendants);
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (abrogation
provisions of Trademark Remedy Clarification Act invalidated); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (abrogation provisions of Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act invalidated); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(Religious Freedom Restoration Act invalidated as applied to states and localities); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act invalidated); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act
invalidated as applied to state judges).
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majority that had set aside nearly seventy years of federalism precedent in favor
of a devolution of federal power to the states, deciding a long string of cases
carving out new and strictured interpretations of the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment, and an expanded reading of the Eleventh Amendment,
all to bolster state authority over state concerns.7 Against this backdrop, Bush v.
Gore was a stark reversal with boldly political and partisan purposes.
Although blatant, the political subtext of the Bush v. Gore majority decision
was not a complete surprise to those of us working in support of equality for
women, gay men, lesbians, bisexuals and transgender Americans. In fact, Bush v.
Gore was one of a series of Supreme Court decisions in 2000 where the Court
evaded precedent in order to achieve politically charged objectives.
One of the most halting Supreme Court decisions with broad implications for
civil rights law was United States v. Morrison.8 In Morrison, the Supreme Court
continued its "states' rights" charge by invalidating the civil rights remedy of the
1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). 9 The civil rights remedy enabled
victims of gender-motivated violence to sue their assailants in federal or state
court for compensatory or punitive damages, declaratory or injunctive relief and
attorneys fees.'o Congress enacted VAWA, including its civil rights remedy, with
extensive documentation of the effect of violence against women on interstate
commerce and the unequal treatment states give victims of gender-motivated
violence. "
In invalidating the civil rights remedy, the Supreme Court ruled that the
remedy was not a valid exercise of Congress' authority to regulate activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce.12 The Court characterized the congres-
7. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 582 U.S. 62 (2000) (Congress did not act appropriately in
abrogating state sovereign immunity when it authorized suits under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act against states in federal courts); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Congress had no
power to force state courts to entertain federally created claims for damages against state defendants);
Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (abrogation
provisions of Trademark Remedy Clarification Act invalidated); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (abrogation provisions of Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act invalidated); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(Religious Freedom Restoration Act invalidated as applied to states and localities); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act invalidated); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act
invalidated as applied to state judges); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Gun Free
School Zone Act was an unconstitutional use of Commerce Clause power by Congress); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Congress lacked the constitutional authority to enact the civil rights
remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act). For a more recent example of the Court's expanded
view of the Eleventh Amendment, see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
(Eleventh Amendment barred claims against state defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990).
8. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981 (2000), overruled by United States v. Morrison, 529 US 598 (2000).
10. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605-06 (2000).
11. See id. at 631-34.
12. See id. at617.
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sional findings of the substantial effect of gender-motivated violence on interstate
commerce as "attenuated," 1 3 and thus insufficient to justify congressional action
under the Commerce Clause."4 The Court also rejected Congress's invocation of
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as authority for enacting the civil rights
remedy. 15 Section 5 enables Congress to enforce the constitutional guarantees
found within the Fourteenth Amendment.1 6 The Court refused to acknowledge
that state inaction to remedy identified instances of gender-motivated violence
qualified as state inaction for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.17
The immediate effects of Morrison are clear. Women no longer have a civil
right of action against gender-motivated violence in federal court, and must
instead rely on state criminal and tort laws for relief-laws that a bipartisan
Congress deemed inadequate to remedy the problem of gender-motivated
violence. Even more damaging, however, are Morrison's implications for civil
rights legislation generally, insofar as it places onerous evidentiary burdens on
Congress' ability to determine what is an important national interest and enact
responsive legislation.18
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the same narrow, conservative Supreme
Court majority in Morrison and Bush glossed over well-established First
Amendment precedent in favor of holding that the mere presence of gay men and
boys in the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) membership would interfere with the
organization's right of expressive association. 9 The BSA had appealed a
decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court, upholding the application of a state
13. See id. at 599.
14. See id. at 614 ("The existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the
constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation."). But see id. at 631-34 (Souter, J., dissenting)
("mountain of data" assembled by Congress demonstrating the very real effects gender motivated
violence has on interstate commerce was more than sufficient justification for Congress to enact the civil
rights remedy).
15. See id. at 627.
16. Namely, the guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of laws, nor deny any person equal protection of the laws. Section 5 allows Congress to enact
legislation that prohibits conduct that is not itself unconstitutional. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
17. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000).
18. Fortunately, the Morrison Court left open possibilities for future legislation that would address
gender motivated violence and satisfy the Court's intensified evidentiary requirement of a "substantial
effect" on "economic activity." For example, Congress should immediately pass the Federal hate crimes
bill, now named the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act (LLEEA). S. 625, 107th Cong. (2001).
H.R. 1343, 107th Cong. (2001). LLEEA would expand existing law to allow federal prosecutions of hate
crimes committed on the basis of sexual orientation, gender and disability. In the 106th Congress, the
Senate passed the bill by a vote of fifty-seven to forty-two, with support from thirteen Republican
Senators. The House of Representatives voted 232 to 192 to support inclusion of the LLEEA in the
Department of Defense Authorization bill on September 13, 2000. The vote was a non-binding motion
instructing the House members of the Joint House-Senate Conference Committee on the Department of
Defense Authorization bill to accept the Senate-passed language of LLEEA although the House had never
voted upon the hate crimes bill. Despite majority support of LLEEA in both chambers of Congress, the
Republican Congressional leadership removed the bill in the waning days of conference committee. See
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-945, at 9493 (2000).
19. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of
public accommodation.2 °
Under well-established principles of First Amendment expressive associa-
21reurdaariuaetion, the Court was required to determine whether the BSA had an articulated
and coherent anti-gay message and whether that message would be substantially
altered by the mere presence of gay members. The Dale majority ignored this test
and merely accepted the BSA's argument, at face value, that its message had
always been anti-gay despite the fact that the organization provided little if any
support for that position.22 The majority not only failed to scrutinize the BSA's
claims as it had in prior expressive association cases, but also failed to address the
overwhelming evidence that the BSA had never had anti-gay positions as part of
its core values and message, nor had discharged heterosexual members who
disagreed with that position.
23
In essence, the Dale case represented the first time that the Supreme Court
allowed organizations to discriminate against a class of people just. because of
who they are, only by declaring, even if just in pleadings, that they do not like
them. No doubt influenced by the BSA's quintessentially American "mom and
apple pie" image, the Supreme Court seemed to balk at the prospect of requiring
the organization to admit members who did not fit the 1950s stereotype of an
"All-American boy." In Dale, the political power of the BSA as a venerated
American institution trumped the neutral application of a state nondiscrimination
statute and long-settled constitutional law.
Although advocates working in support of civil rights for women, gay and
transgender people have weathered a number of setbacks in the last year, we also
have enjoyed significant successes. The implementation of the Vermont Civil
Unions law was one of them. On December 20, 1999, the Vermont Supreme
Court ruled that the state constitution's Common Benefits Clause prohibited the
discrimination against same-sex couples in the provision of statutory benefits and
protections of marriage.24 The court directed the Vermont legislature to remedy
the discrimination, which it did in April 2000, by enacting the "Act Relating to
20. See Dale v. Boy Scouts ofAm., 734A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999).
21. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), (state law requiring the Jaycees to
admit women as members upheld). The Jaycees, like the Boy Scouts of American in Dale, argued that
forcing the organization to admit women into its membership would interfere with its expressive
association rights by, inter alia, altering the organization's message. The Court reasoned that the presence
of women in the Jaycees would have no effect on its message. See id.
22. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,653 ("We cannot doubt that the Boy Scouts sincerely
holds this [anti-gay) view."). But see id. at 667 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (because anti-gay bigotry has
never been a part of the BSA's mission or purpose, the presence of gay members in the organization
would have no effect whatsoever on its expression, citing the Scoutmasters Handbook, which directs
Scoutmasters to steer clear of discussing sexuality with Scouts and instead refers them to their parents,
physician or teachers).
23. See id. at 655.
24. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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Civil Union.",2' The law extends to same-sex couples the effect of every state law,
regulation and court precedent that applies to married couples.2 6 Although either
branch of Vermont state government that addressed the issue should have fully
authorized same-sex marriage, the creation of civil unions was a significant step
in the right direction, recognizing the committed relationships of same-sex
couples as the legal equivalent of married couples.27
The last year also brought a narrow Supreme Court defense of a woman's right
to choose. Over the past several years, thirty-one states have enacted bans on
so-called "partial-birth" abortions. Richard A. Posner, Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and a Reagan appointee, noted in
the Hope Clinic v. Ryan that this rush to pass state late term abortion bans did not
"exhibit the legislative process at its best" and instead "produce[d] a set of laws
that can fairly be described as irrational ... [and] concerned with making a
statement... that fetal life is more valuable than women's health. 28
On June 28, 2000, the Supreme Court in Stenberg v. Carhart upheld the Eighth
Circuit's decision five to four, striking down a Nebraska ban on partial-birth
abortion as unconstitutional because it excluded an exception for the preservation
of the health of the mother and because the statute unduly burdened the right of
women to choose abortion.29 Although Stenberg was a victory for women's rights
advocates and their allies, the fact that the Court was one Justice away from
constitutionally validating significant state limitations on abortion procedures is
deeply troubling. Also of concern were the often conflicting viewpoints articulated by
the justices in one majority opinion, three concurring opinions and four
dissenting opinions, 30 with Justice Scalia in his dissent equating the majority's
decision to the Supreme Court's infamous Korematsu and Dred Scott decisions.31
25. See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 et seq. (1999). See also Richard Higgins, Vermont Licenses
First Two Civil Unions, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 2000, at B 1.
26. See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 et seq. (1999).
27. There are, however, 'a few significant exceptions caused by the legal contusions of the "separate
but equal" objective of the Civil Unions statute. Most importantly, a civilly united same-sex couple in
Vermont is not currently able to have its civil union recognized by any of the other forty-nine states,
whereas couples married in Vermont have their marriages recognized everywhere else.
28, Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 880-81 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting).
29. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
30. Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion, with Stevens, Ginsburg and O'Connor each filing a
separate concurrence. Each of the dissenters, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, filed
dissenting opinions of their own.
31. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I am optimistic enough to
believe that, one day, Stenberg v. Carhart will be assigned its rightful place in the history of this Court's
jurisprudence beside Korematsu and Dred Scott."). In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution conferred no rights on African Americans as citizens and disempowered Congress from
prohibiting the practice of slavery. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). In Korematsu, the
Supreme Court, deferring to military judgment and applying strict scrutiny, affirmed the constitutionality
of the internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry during World War H. See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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Although Stenberg reached the right result, it exposed an increasingly splintered
and fragile pro-choice majority on the Court.
The last year also brought us progress in the battle against sodomy laws. Most
notably, an Arkansas court ruled on March 23, 2001, that the state statute banning
consensual same-sex sodomy12 was invalid under the state constitution. Pulaski
County Circuit Court Judge David B. Bogard held that an adult's right to engage
in "consensual and noncommercial" sexual activity in that adult's home "is a
matter of intimate personal concern which is at the heart of the right to privacy in
Arkansas" and that such a right "should not be diminished or afforded less
constitutional protection when the adults in that private activity are of the same
gender."'33 Also, Arizona became the twenty-sixth state to repeal its sodomy law
on May 8, 2001.34 As of May 2001, only four states-Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma
and Texas-had sodomy laws that apply only to same-sex couples (assuming the
Arkansas case is not overturned).35 These laws stigmatize gay people and
promote anti-gay violence 36 and police harassment,37 undermine support for civil
rights and hate crimes legislation,38 and justify discrimination against gay people
in employment 39 and parental custody and visitation proceedings. 40 Twelve other
32. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (2001).
33. Picado v. Jegley, No. CV 99-7048, slip op. (Pulaski County Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2001); see also
"Same-Sex Sodomy Law Deemed Unconstitutional," ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Mar. 24, 2001, at
Al.
34. See Will O'Bryan, Ariz. Lifts Sodomy Ban, WASH. BLADE, May 11, 2001, at 1.
35. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 886 (2001); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.).
36. See Timothy W. Reinig, Sin, Stigma & Society: A Critique of Morality and Values in Democratic
Law and Policy, 38 BuFF. L. REv. 859, 898 (1990) ("Sodomy legislation has the effect of reinforcing and
perpetuating this stigmatization of gay people and, consequently, the prejudices and hatred of
homophobes and queer-bashers."); see also Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries
Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103 (2000) (documents how
sodomy laws legitimize police harassment of gay people by entrapping and arresting gay men for
solicitation to commit private, consensual sodomy).
37. See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy
Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103, 127-29 (documents how sodomy laws legitimize police
harassment of gay people by entrapping and arresting gay men for solicitation to commit private,
consensual sodomy).
38. See, e.g., Terry S. Kogan, Legislative Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 1994 UTAH L. REv.
209, 232 (1994) (provides several examples of how in states that maintain sodomy statutes, "legislators
invoke the sodomy law in debate as justification for denying legal protections to homosexuals, who get
represented as immoral criminals deserving of punishment").
39. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11 th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (termination of a lesbian staff
attorney in Georgia Attorney General's office upheld, invoking the then existing Georgia sodomy law as
justification); see also Evan Wolfson & Robert Mower, When the Police Are In Our Bedrooms, Shouldn't
the Courts Go In After Them?: An Update on the FightAgainst "Sodomy" Laws, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
997, 1035, n.39 (1994) (discusses Woodward v. Gallagher, No. 89-5776 (Orange County, Fla. Cir. Ct.,
filed June 9, 1992), where county sheriff relied on state's sodomy law to terminate gay deputy when
sexual orientation was discovered).
40. See, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (Sharon Bottoms' son should be taken
away from her because "conduct inherent in lesbianism is punishable as a... felony in the
Commonwealth ... [and] thus, that conduct is another important consideration in determining custody.").
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states and Puerto Rico still criminalize sex acts between gay and non-gay
consenting adults.4 '
We also saw progress in the state legislatures concerning anti-discrimination
legislation. Maryland became the twelfth state in the nation to ban discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.42 The Maryland Anti-Discrimination Act of
2001 covers employment, housing, and public accommodations, and will become
effective October 1, 2001. Laws banning employment discrimination against
transgender workers are also on the upswing, with thirty-three state and local
governments providing protection for transgender individuals. Minnesota, the
District of Columbia and thirty-one municipalities (including Decatur, Georgia
and Louisville, Kentucky) protect transgender people either through legislation
or executive order.4 3
The last year also brought us great progress in persuading corporate America to
41. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-63, 64 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605
(2001); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.89 (2001); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 34, -35 (2001); Mtci.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.158 (2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (2001); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59
(2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-403 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (2001); 33 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 4065 (1990). But see Picado
v. Jegley, No. CV 99-7048, slip op. (Pulaski County Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2001) (Arkansas sodomy statute
struck down and awaits appeal); Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478 ("we conclude that [the
unnatural and lascivious acts law] must be construed to be inapplicable to private, consensual conduct of
adults."). It has been suggested that this ruling would apply to Massachusetts' crime against nature statute
as well. See Sodomy Laws, at http://www.queerpess.com/sodomy.html (October 1998); State Restric-
tions on Sodomy, at http://www.rand.orglpublicationslMR/MR323/mr323.appi.pdf (last visited, May 20,
2001); Mich. Org. for Human Rights v. Kelley, No. 88-815820 CZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990)
(Michigan's sodomy law unconstitutional under the state constitution). As the state Attorney General
didn't appeal this ruling, the broader precedential value of the ruling is in question, and the ruling may
only apply to Wayne County where it was issued; The Data Lounge, Puerto Rico High Court to Review
Sodomy Law, at htip-:Iwww.datalounge.comidatalounge/news/record.htmlrecord=9333 (August 11,
2000) (Puerto Rico Supreme Court heard arguments to determine whether the sodomy law violates its
constitution in Sanchez et al. v. Commonwealth).
42. See Deb Price, Glendening Paves Way to Protect Gays, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 16, 2001, at 9
(Maryland passes sexual orientation nondiscrimination act). Maryland joins California, Connecticut, the
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. See CAL. LAS. CODE § 1102.1 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-81(c) (West 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2557 (1997); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 378-2
(Michie 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1997);
1997 N.H. Laws 108; NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330 (Michie 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West
1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-24-2 to 11-24-2.2, 28-5-3, 28-5-5, 28-5-7 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 495 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.36 (West 1997). All twelve jurisdictions prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in employment and all but California extend this protection to public
and/or private housing. Minnesota and Wisconsin also outlaw sexual orientation discrimination in public
and private education. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.12 (West 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 36.12, 38.23
(West 1999).
43. See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Human Rights Campaign Foundation WorkNet, at
www.hrc.org/worknet (last visited Apr. 27, 2001). Note that in December 2000, a Polk County (IA)
district judge invalidated a December 1999 executive order issued by Iowa Governor Tom Vilsack which
prohibited discrimination in state employment based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
Responding to a court challenge by Republican legislators, the judge ruled that Vilsack's order intruded
on the lawmaking authority of the Iowa legislature. See Jonathan Roos, Vilsack Bias Ban Shakes Up
GOP, DES MOINES REGISTER, Mar. 30, 2001, at 6.
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voluntarily extend nondiscrimination protections and domestic partner benefits to
lesbian and gay employees. As of April 2001, the Human Rights Campaign
(HRC) Foundation had identified 3691 private companies, colleges and universi-
ties and state and local governments that offer domestic partner health insurance
benefits to their employees. Since 1999, the number of Fortune 500 companies
that offer the benefits has risen from seventy to 122, an increase of sixty
percent.44 HRC Foundation also reported that seventy-seven of the Fortune 100
include sexual orientation in their non-discrimination policies.45
In light of the Supreme Court's bold conservative activism in Bush v. Gore, and
our narrow successes and failures at the Supreme Court and lower courts over the
last year, we must start to view federal judges and courts as the intrinsically
political beings that they are.46 We must, accordingly, devote much more
vigilance and resources to the federal judicial confirmation process. We need to
ensure that those nominees who are confirmed for Supreme Court and other
federal court benches have the judicial temperament, commitment to civil rights
and individual liberty and privacy, and sense of fairness befitting a lifetime
judicial appointee.
Although we should always be active advocates in the judicial nomination
process, the next two years promise to be the most formative ones in American
judicial history. It is not an overstatement to say that the men and women that
President Bush appoints to the federal judiciary will define American constitu-
tional jurisprudence-and our lives as women, men, straight, gay, bisexual and
transgender Americans-for the twenty-first century. President Bush has a broad
canvas upon which to paint his vision of a conservative judiciary. As of April 1,
2001, there were ninety-seven vacancies of 859 existing seats on the Federal
appellate bench, with at least two Supreme Court vacancies anticipated in the
near future.
Our vigilance in judicial selection is especially important given that the
Supreme Court's conservative majority in Bush v. Gore virtually appointed and
confirmed its own successors by handing the election to President Bush. And
indications are clear that President Bush is politicizing the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts even more. President Bush publicly announced that he
would strip the American Bar Association of its longstanding role of reviewing
and rating prospective judicial nominees before their names are submitted for
Senate confirmation.47 In place of the ABA, White House sources report that
membership in-or an endorsement from-the Federalist Society, a hard-right
44. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED AMERICANS 2000, at 6, available at http://www.hrc.org/worknet.
45. See id.
46. Of course, we should be vigilant with state judge appointments or elections as well, considering
the impact state courts have on our lives, especially in the context of family law, sodomy, and other areas
traditionally under state control.
47. See Amy Goldstein, Bush CurtailsABA Role in Selecting U.S. Judges, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2001,
atAl.
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conservative legal organization known for its hostility to civil rights laws and
promotion of a weakened federal government, will be considered an important
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credential for prospective nominees.
All of these factors, combined with President Bush's failure to win the popular
vote and the widely disputed legitimacy of his presidency, mean that the civil
rights community has no choice but to closely scrutinize President Bush's
judicial nominations. We must refuse to allow the confirmation of judges who
will turn back the clock on civil rights for women, gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgender Americans, and other minorities.
We also must learn to better work together as advocates in support of equality
for women, gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people. Litigators, legislative
lawyers and academics need to find new ways to strategize and work collabora-
tively and approach what we do.
James Madison in the Federalist Papers wrote, "the accumulation of all
powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands... may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.",49 The fact that conservative
Republicans control all three branches of Federal government certainly calls for
the increased cooperation among litigators, legislative lawyers and scholars
working toward equality for straight and lesbian women, gay, bisexual and
transgender Americans. The agenda of the conservative leadership in Washington
D.C. is relatively cohesive, and incorporates judicial, legislative and regulatory
initiatives. Ours should be just as comprehensive, synthesizing litigation and
legislative initiatives while also recognizing the intersections that pervade
gender, sexuality, and sexual orientation law and policy.
The Second Annual Review helps us do just that. It is a necessary resource for
all of us who study or work in support of equality for straight and lesbian women,
gay, bisexual and transgender Americans. Its broad, yet detailed, coverage of
constitutional and legal developments across important areas of gender and
sexuality law provides a one-of-a-kind, comprehensive research tool to practitio-
ners, academics and others. In order to most effectively build the future, we must
know where we have been and where we stand today. The Second Annual Review
gives us that crucial perspective in our journey toward equality.
48. See Marianne Means, ABA's Ouster Opens Courts to Right-Wing Idealists, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr.
1, 2001, at 3; Thomas B. Edsall, Federalist Society Becomes a Force in Washington, WASH. POST, Apr.
18, 2001, at A4.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
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